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Army Transformation: Ill-Advised from a Joint Perspective?
If one were to ask Americans today about the United States Army, some would certainly say the Army is changing. Even though they might not use the word transformation, they might talk of black berets or an "Army of One". However, few
Americans understand the real transformation the Army is undergoing: General Shinseki's vision for a future Objective Force. Even though many have questioned the necessity of black berets, few seem to be asking about the transformation of the Army, especially as it relates to the joint environment in which the Army must operate. Some pertinent questions might be: Was the Army's transformation effort a single service endeavor or was it a joint service plan? Will there be enough money available to fund the Army's transformation in the joint context? Could the transformation effort leave the joint force potentially vulnerable to conventional ground-based threats? After addressing each of these questions, we will see that, on balance and from a joint perspective, the Army's current transformation efforts are ill-advised.
Background
In August of 1990, noted political scientist John Mearsheimer wrote an article entitled "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War". At the time, it seemed almost impossible that people would ever long for the days of nuclear standoff with the Soviet Union. However, his major theme was that the bipolar nature of the Cold War brought stability and focus we would soon miss. 1 In many ways, his words were prophetic, particularly for the United States Armed Forces. Formidable and designed to fight the Soviet threat, the U.S. military found itself in unfamiliar territory during the much of the 1990s. Instead of preparing for a well-defined Soviet threat, the Armed Forces were called upon to participate in ever increasing numbers of humanitarian and small-scale contingencies. In essence, the Armed Forces were called upon to shape the international environment as never before. This shaping mission often brought with it the requirement to deploy quickly to areas of the world that were of little importance during the Cold War e.g. former Yugoslavia, Haiti, and Somalia. Even though none of the services were absolutely prepared for rapid deployments, the U.S. Army was the least prepared. Its prime warfighting equipment (tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, and aviation) was designed for a high intensity, ground conflict against forces like those of the former Soviet Union. They were not necessarily designed for rapid deployment to locations like Somalia or Kosovo. This inability to deploy rapidly set the stage for General Shinseki's call for transformation.
Transforming the U.S. Army
The essence of the Army's transformation strategy is to develop a future
Objective Force that will be more "responsive, The answers to these and many others will no doubt shape the future of this Objective Force. Given this background and General Shinseki's vision for the Army we can now look at the issue of transforming the Army from a joint perspective. This joint perspective is defined looking at a problem from a multi-service, non-biased perspective.
In essence, a joint perspective is one that looks for synergy, not for single service gain or dominance.
Single Service or Joint Plan?
Instead of responding from a joint perspective, Army transformation seems to have been developed based on a service specific requirement to be relevant in a changing environment. In many ways, the end of the Cold War and the transition into missions designed to mold the international environment left the "heavy Army" out of the immediate mix of assets required for operations. For example, Les Aspin, the Secretary 5 Shinseki, 7.
6 Shinski, 8.
of Defense, did not want tanks deployed to Somalia because he saw them as being potentially too provocative for what was largely a humanitarian mission. Then President Clinton stated that ground forces would not be part of NATO's efforts in Kosovo; air power could accomplish the mission alone. However, when the Army was called upon to deploy an aviation heavy task force, it took so long for the deployment to occur that the forces were never used.
Clearly, from an Army perspective, something had to be done to make its heavy forces more relevant. However, was this call for transformation an effort to meet joint requirements or one simply to meet Army needs? An analogy may help answer the question. There were two running backs on a football team who found themselves under a new "all pass" coaching philosophy. Under the old system, the backs ran the ball as part of a balanced running/throwing attack. Under the new system, heavy thrusts into the line of scrimmage were only an afterthought for the coach. In order to be relevant, the running backs decided they needed to be able to catch the ball out of the backfield.
Therefore, they lost weight in order to increase quickness. They do this to make themselves more relevant, not because of a team philosophy to make them more relevant.
In many respects, the Army is transforming itself so it can catch passes out of the backfield and be relevant again. If this plan were part of a total joint transformation effort from the coaching staff, looking at the roles of all players, it would be better coordinated and potentially more effective. However, this plan appears to be primarily the Army's idea. However, over the next several years the Army's 20-ton vehicle, interim force will be much more vulnerable to conventional ground-based threats than heavy forces have been in the past. "Current 20-ton vehicles are much more vulnerable than heavier vehicles. Most likely will be able to stop a 7.62 mm bullet but would need additional, bolted on armor to protect against a 14.5 mm heavy machine gun and primitive rockets such as the Russian rocket-propelled grenades." 17 When it comes to more potent systems, this interim force would be overmatched. "Missiles or tank cannon fire, even a 20mm quick-firing cannon, found on cheap Russian vehicles sold worldwide, [would] kill the medium brigade's lightly armored vehicles." 18 Therefore, in the short-term, a joint force using the Army's interim capability would be vulnerable to a basic groundbased threat. A solution might be to call the Air Force in to defeat these threats the Army previously was able to easily defeat.
In defense of the transformation effort, future combat systems are supposed to be superior to current systems and weigh only 20 tons. One way to achieve the weight loss might be a distributed system that relies on smaller, more easily transportable components. "Rather than rely on heavy armor to take hits, the components would exploit their small size, high speed, and advanced electronics to avoid detection in the 
Solutions to the Problem
From a joint perspective, the Army's transformation program is ill-advised because it is based on the service specific need to be relevant and not on joint needs; Command. These efforts could better focus future combat system developments and balance them against lift requirements so that each is not competing against the others.
Another approach would be to modify the Army's current transformation effort.
Steven Kosiak, Andrew Krepinevich, and Michael Vickers posit an interesting modification.
The Army should proceed with its current transformation effort, but it should modify to better address emerging threats, as well as existing requirements. This means earmarking one division (and associated National Guard units) to conduct field exercises oriented on solving the anti-access challenge, developing an advanced capability to conduct urban control and eviction operations, and exploiting the potential of ground forces to see deep and engage at extended ranges. 21 However, even though this recommendation would certainly strengthen the Army's ability to better address emerging threats, it would do little to address the joint problems of funding and those of short-term ground-based vulnerability.
Another solution would be a quasi-legacy/interim force. A portion of the legacy force would be replaced by interim brigades, which would fill the gap between light and heavy forces. However, a vast majority of the legacy force would remain with the industrial base to support it. Ironically, this option might occur naturally after General Shinseki leaves as the Army Chief of Staff in 2003. Without the key architect of the plan in place, the effort may lose momentum. The result might be a partially transformed quasi-legacy/interim force that has elements more deployable and lethal than the current light or heavy forces, but with a retained heavy conventional capability. However, from a joint perspective, a coordinated effort to focus the Army's transformation program would certainly be better than hoping for a partially transformed quasi-legacy/interim force.
One might ask, "What about the Army's need to be more 'responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable and sustainable than the present force?'" Granted, without each of the team members having every optimal capability. In the end from a joint perspective, the Army must be a relevant member of the joint team; therefore, transformation efforts need to focus on joint relevance, not Army relevance alone.
